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Survey of Professional Responsibility
decision in Shapero and stands as firmly as ever on this issue.4
Philip Franke
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR
A state has a legitimate interest in assuring that only qualified
attorneys are admitted to practice law.' To further this policy,
states have established criteria for admission to the bar.2 Gener-
ally, admission has been conditioned upon a lawyer's knowledge of
state law, a showing of "good moral character," and proof of state
residency.3 However, the long-standing residency requirements
for admission to practice have been challenged as violative of the
privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.4 This article will review the most significant of such chal-
4 See Koffler, supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
See Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 434
(1982) (states have power and strong interest in controlling state's legal profession);
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872) (power to regulate and control prac-
tice of law is province of state not federal government). See also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 722-23 (1973) (state has interest "to assure the requisite qualifications of persons li-
censed to practice law"); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401
U.S. 154, 159 (1971) (Court affirmed New York requirement that attorneys "possess ...
character and general fitness"); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239
(1957) (state can require high standard of qualifications to admit applicant to bar). See gen-
erally Brakel & Loh, Regulating Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. REv. 699, 708 (1975)
(state has interest in assuring that attorneys who practice are competent and skilled in local
practice); Note, Residence Requirements for Initial Admission to the Bar: A Compromise Proposal
for Change, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 832-33 (1971) (purpose of residency requirement is to
guard citizens from inept practice of law).
' See Schware, 353 U.S. at 239 (states may impose qualifications which have a "rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice"). See, e.g., Gordon v. Com-
mittee on Character and Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 273, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 1313, 422
N.Y.S.2d 641, 645 (1979) (states have created criteria for admission to bar through exer-
cise of their police power); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (qualifications
required should be "appropriate to the calling or profession").
' See Brakel & Loh, supra note 1, at 707 n.28 (residency requirement is prime issue in
multi-state practice); Note, supra note 1, at 833-837. Knowledge of the local laws and cus-
toms is usually tested through a bar examination. Id. at 833. Moral character is important
in protecting not only the public but the "character and integrity of the bar . I..." d  at
834-35. Residency requirements have been characterized as the "most patently unreasona-
ble and discriminatory requirement[s], in terms of both theory and practical conse-
quences." Id. at 836.
' U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
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lenges in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion on the topic - Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman.5
Residency Requirements
Typically, states have chosen to impose either a "simple" or
"durational" residency standard.6 A simple residency requirement
merely prescribes that an attorney be domiciled in the state in
which admission is sought, while a durational residency require-
ment necessitates that the applicant reside in the state for a fixed
period of time prior to application, examination, or admission.'
States have justified such regulations on grounds that they en-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Id. The purpose of the Clause was
originally set forth in the Articles of Confederation, which stated:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these
States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of
each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall
enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties,
impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof ....
ART. OF CONFED. art. IV, cl. 1.
Traditionally, the clause encompassed what are termed "fundamental" or "natural"
rights. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). These rights included the
right to pass through or reside in any state "for purposes of trade, agriculture, or profes-
sional pursuits ... ; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state";
and to take, hold and dispose of real or personal property. Id. at 552. The scope of the
Clause was later broadened to include not only "fundamental rights" but also those rights
which "insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which
the citizens of State B enjoy." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).
The Supreme Court has since interpreted the Clause to bar a state's preferential treat-
ment of residents in certain employment opportunities and in issuing commercial licenses.
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). The privileges and immunities clause prohibits
states from discriminating against nonresidents solely to further their own parochial inter-
ests. See Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1314, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646. See also
Note, The Future of State Bar Residence Requirements Under the Privileges and Immunites
Clause, 26 S.D.L. REv. 79, 80-81 (1981). Due to infrequent litigation over the privileges and
immunities clause, the scope of the privilege was not readily ascertainable. See generally L.
TRIBE, AMFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7.2-4, at 415-25 (1978) (discussing privileges and
immunities clause's dormant periods).
The Clause does not prohibit states from differentiating between residents and nonresi-
dents under all circumstances, only those which bear "upon the vitality of the Nation as a
single entity .... " Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
5 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988).
' See Note, supra note 4, at 79-80; Cox, Requirements of Residency Requirements for Admis-
sion to the Bar Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, 40 UNAUTH. PRAC NEWS 260
(1977). The fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Is-
lands all require some form of these criteria. Id.
' See Note, supra note 4, at 80.
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courage an attorney to become familiar with local customs and
practices; permit the attorney's peers to observe his or her behav-
ior to determine moral character; afford the attorney a deeper
sense of community responsibility; and accord the applicant an op-
portunity to prove an intention to become a permanent resident.8
In the past, a majority of courts upheld or indicated strong ap-
proval of state durational residency requirements of six months or
less. Over the last few decades, however, such requirements have
been attacked as violative of the equal protection clause, the due
process clause, the Sherman Act and most recently, the privileges
and immunities clause.1
New York Abolishes the Residency Requirement
In Gordon v. Committee of Character and Fitness, New York's du-
rational residency requirement was challenged as unconstitu-
tional."' Gordon had been a New York resident for over two years
when he sat for and passed the state's bar examination.' During
the period subsequent to the examination and prior to his applica-
tion for admission, the plaintiff was transferred by his employer to
North Carolina. s Gordon's admission to the bar was denied solely
a See id. at 85; Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements Under the
Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1461, 1480 (1979)
(states' interest supporting residency requirements identified as administrative convenience,
need to observe behavior and character, familiarity with local court procedures and cus-
toms, ease of service of process, and availability for bar discipline).
' See Note, The Constitutionality of State Residency Requirements for Attorneys Under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause: The Attack Continues, 60 NEB. L. REV. 200, 201 (1981). "A major-
ity of courts in this century have upheld or strongly indicated approval of state residency
requirements of six months or less." Id.
W0 See, e.g., Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961) (Kansas rule disallowing lawyer who
regularly practiced in Missouri from appearing in Kansas court without Kansas lawyer at-
tacked on equal protection grounds); Smith v. Davis, 350 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. W. Va. 1972)
(invalidated one year residency requirement on due process grounds); Lipman v. Van Zant,
329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (one year residency requirement violated equal protec-
tion clause); Kennan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. N.C. 1970) (one
year residency requirement violated right to travel); Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 620 P.2d
640 (Alaska 1980) (thirty-day residency requirement for bar examination violated privi-
leges and immunities clause). See also Note, The Sherman Act and Bar Association Residence
Requirements, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 615 (1975) (residency requirements attacked as violative
of Sherman Act).
" 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
12 Id. at 269-70, 397 N.E.2d at 1310-11, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
11 Id. Gordon felt that his prior New York residence qualified him for admission to the
bar and subsequently filed with the Committee of Character and Fitness of the First De-
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on his failure to retain residence in New York for the six month
period immediately preceding his application."' The New York
Court of Appeals found the six month residency requirement vio-
lative of the privileges and immunities clause. 18
The court reasoned that the state's restriction which impaired
the nonresident's ability to pursue his occupation failed to pass
two constitutional hurdles.16 First, the state's interest in procurikig
discriminatory action through residency requirements was not
substantial; nonresidents did not present an "evil to which the
statute is aimed."11 7 Second, assuming that the nonresidents
presented an evil to state interests, the statutory method for pro-
tecting that interest was not the least restrictive alternative availa-
ble for achieving its goal.18
The state legislature responded by amending the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules to abolish the residency requirement
for both applicants seeking admission by bar examination' as well
partment for admission to practice. Id.
14 Id.
"' Id. The court found that N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 9406(2) required an attorney to give
up his occupation for at least six months and move to New York in order to be admitted to
practice in New York. id. at 272-73, 397 N.E.2d at 1312-13, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 645. The
court further found that an attorney who engaged in multi-state practice was prevented
from doing so under the statute. Id. "The disparity of treatment between residents of this
state and non-residents is manifest; given two equally qualified candidates who have passed
the bar examination .. .and possess the requisite character and fitness, the rule would
deny one admission based solely on residence." Id. at 273, 397 N.E.2d at 1313, 422
N.Y.S.2d at 645.
" Id. The court realized that states have a legitimate interest in assuring that only quali-
fied attorneys are admitted to the bar. Id. However, the court found that the residency
requirement was not the least restrictive alternative available to the state in assuring that
attorneys are properly supervised and discipline. Id. at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1314, 422
N.Y.S.2d at 646. In lieu of the residency requirement, the state could instead require non-
resident attorneys to appoint an agent in the state for service of process. Id. Also, state
disciplinary remedies such as contempt, suspension or revocation of license, and malprac-
tice actions were available as a means of disciplining nonresident attorneys. Id.
17 Id. at 273, 397 N.E.2d at 1313, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 645. The court found "no valid
reason [was] proffered as to why admission to practice law before the courts of [the] state
must be dependent upon -residency." Id. The court viewed the purpose of the residency
rule as mere "administrative convenience and not closely tailored to a legitimate state in-
terest." Id. at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1313, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
1" Id. at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1314, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646. The state had other remedies to
insure that nonresident attorneys were properly supervised and disciplined short of an ab-
solute prohibition of non-residents. Id. See supra note 16.
t" Act of June 18, 1985, ch. 226, § 6 (1985) N.Y. LAws 556 (codified as amended at N.Y.
Ctv. PRAc, L. & R. 9406 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
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as for those seeking reciprocal admission on motion. 0
The Supreme Court's Reaction
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court followed New York's
lead by declaring residency requirements for admission to the
New Hampshire Bar unconstitutional under the privileges and im-
munities clause in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper." Piper,
a Vermont resident, successfully completed the New Hampshire
Bar Examination and applied for admission to the bar." Admis-
sion was denied on the ground that Piper had failed to establish a
residence in New Hampshire."8 The Supreme Court confirmed
that the ability to practice one's profession is a fundamental right
within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause. 4 The
Court also found no substantial state interest for discrimination
against nonresident applicants to the bar sufficient to pass consti-
tutional muster, 8 and the residency rule was invalidated."
10 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90 (1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988). Under the statute, any person ad-
mitted to practice law in any other state or territory or the District of Columbia may be
admitted without taking the regular bar examination, provided the applicant possesses the
character and general fitness requisite for an attorney. Id. In addition, the applicant must
have been admitted to practice in the highest court of the other state for at least five of the
seven years immediately preceding the application. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & RE(s. tit. 22 §
520.9(2)(i) (1987).
" 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
n Id. at 275-76. Kathryn Piper lived about 400 yards from the New Hampshire border.
Id. at 275. Piper was told by the Board of Bar Examiners prior to applying for admission
that she would have to reside within the state to be admitted to practice. Id. at 275-76.
Piper was found to possess good moral character and satisfied all other requirements of the
Board. Id.
Id. Upon denial, Piper filed an action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Hampshire where she was granted a motion for summary judgment. Id. at
276-77. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
district court decision en banc in Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F.2d
110,118 (1st Cir. 1983).
" Piper, 470 U.S. at 283. The Court held that the "right to practice law is protected by
the Privileges and Immunites Clause." Id.
25 Id. at 285. The State of New Hampshire raised some common justifications for the
residency rule such as familiarity with local rules and customs, ethical behavior, availability
for court proceedings, and availability for pro bono work. Id. The United States Supreme
Court held that the state's justifications were not "substantial" enough to allow such dis-
crimination inasmuch as a lawyer's professional duty to act ethically in the service of his
clients would already require both resident and nonresident attorneys alike to familiarize
themselves with the rules of the state. Id. at 285-86.
" Id. at 288. The Court invalidated Rule 42 of the New Hampshire Supreme Court
which required an applicant for admission to be a "bona fide resident of the State at the
231
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In its last Term, the United States Supreme Court in Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Friedman was faced with the issue of whether
the Piper decision should be extended to residency requirements
for reciprocal admission on motion. 7 Friedman had been a resi-
dent of Virginia, a member of the Illinois and District of Colum-
bia bars and was employed in Washington D.C."8 Shortly after tak-
ing a position with a Virginia corporation, the plaintiff married
and moved to her husband's home just inside the Maryland bor-
der. 9 Her application for admission to the Virginia bar on motion
was denied because she was not currently a Virginia resident."0
Friedman challenged the residency requirement and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held the Virginia
rule unconstitutional. 1 The Fourth Circuit, relying on Piper,
found that the effect of the state's residency rule to deter competi-
tion from nonresident attorneys, a form of economic protection-
ism, was not a valid justification for discrimination against nonresi-
dents and violated the privileges and immunities clause.8'
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Fourth Circuit's decision finding Virginia's residency require-
ments for admission on motion violative of the privileges and im-
munities clause.88 The Court reasoned that the state's full-time
practice requirement was an alternative means for promoting Vir-
ginia's interests without implicating the constitutional concerns
that residency requirements create.3
CONCLUSION
Before Friedman, only nineteen states required all applicants to
time that the oath of office .. .is administered." Id. at 277 n.I (quoting affidavit of John
W. King, App. 32).
27 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988).
" Id. at 2262.
"2Id.
90 Id.
31 822 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1987), affd, 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988).
32 Id. at 428-29.
' Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988).
Id. at 2267. The Court also stated that the State of Virginia could achieve its objec-
tive by requiring the mandatory attendance at periodic continuing legal education courses,
or requiring that attorneys admitted on motion represent indigents and perform legal aid
work. Id.
232
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take the regular bar exam,"5 while five others required either a
modified or special attorney's exam for out-of-state lawyers. 6
Twenty-five states allowed an out-of-state lawyer admission with-
out taking any exam by admission on motion, provided the attor-
ney had been admitted elsewhere for a specific period of time."
Despite the move toward a national practice of law, six states -
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Virginia and Wyoming - attempted
to bypass the Piper decision by still requiring some form of resi-
dence for admission on motion." However, the United States Su-
preme Court's Friedman decision which struck down Virginia's
"See ALA. BAR ADM. R. 1-8; ARiz. Sup. CT. R. 34(c); ARK. SUP. CT. BAR ADM. R. XII; DEL
SUP. CT. R. 52; FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADM. R. Art. I § 1; GA. SuP. CT. R. 2-101 (1987); HAW. SuP.
CT. R. 1-3 (1987); IDAHO BAR COMM'N R. 101 et. seq.; KAN. SUP. CT. R. 704; LA. SuP. CT. R. 17;
NEV. Sup. CT. R. 51; N.H. SuP CT. R. 42; N.J. Sup. CT. R. 1:27-1; N.M. Sup. CT. R. 15-103; OR.
SuP. CT. R. 5; S.C. Sup. CT. BAR ADM. R. 5A; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-16-6 (1987);
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-51-10 (1987); WASH. ADM. PRAC. R. 1.
" See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 6062 (Deering 1988) (attorneys who have practiced
four of six years preceding filing must take modified bar exam); ME. Sup. CT. BAR ADM. R.
10 (attorneys who have practiced at least three of five preceding years must take modified
examination); MD. App. CT. BAR ADM. R. 14 (attorneys who have practiced five of seven
years immediately preceding application must take special essay exam limited to Maryland
Practice and Procedure); MASS. S. CT. R. 3:01 (all attorney applicants who have practiced
five years must pass limited written examination on Massachusetts Practice and Procedure);
MONT. SUP. CT. R. 8.08 (all attorney applicants must take modified exam).
8' See ALASKA BAR R. 2 § 2(c); COLO. R. Civ. PRo. 202 (1988); CONN. SUP. CT. R. § 51.80;
D.C. R. 104 (1987); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 1 1OA § 705 (Smith-Hurd 1988) (only from recipro-
cal state); IND. A.D. R. 6; IOWA Sup. CT. BAR ADM. R. 114; Ky. Sup. CT. R. 2.110; MICH.. STAT.
ANN. § 27A.946 (Callaghan 1986); MINN. SUP. CT. R. VIII; Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-3-25 (West
Supp. 1988); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 8.10 (only from reciprocal state); N.B. REV. STAT. § 7-109
(1987); N.Y. Comp. CODES R. & Rras. tit. 22 § 520.7 (1988); N.C. BAR ADM. R. .0502 (1988)
(only from reciprocal state); N.D. ADM. PRAcG R. 4; OHIO Sup. CT. BAR ADM. R. 1 §9; OKLA.
Sup. CT. BAR R. 17 (only from reciprocal state); PA. CODE vol. 204 § 204 (only from recipro-
cal state); R.I. Sup. CT. R. 34; TENN. SUP. CT. R. 6; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN § 82.036 (Vernon
Supp.1986); VT. SuP. CT. R. T. 12 App. I, Pt. II, R.5; VA. SuP. CT. R. IA:1; W. VA. ADM.
PRAc R. § 3.0 (only from reciprocal state); WIs. Sup. CT. R. 40.05.
" See ILL Sup. CT. R. 705. Illinois requires attorneys to have resided and actively prac-
ticed law in the foreign state for at least five of seven years prior to application. Id.; IND.
A.D. R. 6. Indiana requires attorneys to be bona fide residents of the state and to have
practiced five of seven years prior to application. Id.; IOWA Sup. CT. BAR ADM. R. 114. Iowa
requires attorneys to be inhabitants of Iowa, or to demonstrate a bona fide intention to
open a law office in Iowa, and to have practiced five of seven years immediately preceding
the application. Id.; OHIO SuP. CT. BAR ADM. R. I § 9. Ohio requires attorneys to have
practiced for at least five years and be residents or intend to come into the state for the
purpose of making it their permanent residence. Id.; VA. SuP. CT. R. IA:l(c). Virginia re-
quired attorneys to be state residents at the time of application and show an intent to
maintain an office and practice in the state. Id.; WYo. Sup. CT. R. 5. Wyoming requires
attorneys to be residents at least six months prior to admission and to have practiced five of
the eight years preceding application. Id.
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residency requirement for admission on motion as violative of the
privileges and immunites clause leaves the residency rules in the
five states that continue to enforce them in jeopardy."
The practice of law is expanding into multistate specialties. 0 It
is submitted that once an attorney has passed the multistate bar
examination and has practiced for the requisite period of time, he
should be admitted to practice in any state without having to 're-
side in that state or take its bar exam. In Friedman, the United
States Supreme Court, in an effort to further this trend, has
struck down residency requirements to practice on motion in what
may signal the death knell for all residency requirements associ-
ated with bar admission.
Robert Cote
ETHICS OF CONDUCTING Ex Parte INTERVIEWS
A lawyer who communicates informally with an adverse party
without first obtaining opposing counsel's consent runs the risk of
violating the norms of professional ethics.' The determination of
whether such a violation has occurred is particularly difficult when
the adverse party is a corporation." The Supreme Court has held,
' See supra notes 33 and 38 and accompanying text.
o See Brakel & Loh, supra note 1, at 699-702.
See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 4.2 (1983). The text of the rule
states:
"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the repre-
sentation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter,
unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." Id.
The language of Rule 4.2 resembles that of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBIL-
rry which states:
During the course of his representation of a client the lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representa-
tion with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has
the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law
to do so.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBILrry DR 7-104(A)(1) (1980). See generally
Kurlantzik, The Prohibition on Communication with an Adverse Party, 51 CONN. B.J. 136, 138
(1977) (reason for rule is "imbalance in knowledge and skill between the lawyer and the
adverse party, who is generally a layman.").
" See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977) (since corpo-
234
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